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Abstract 
A number of theoretical models, loosely characterized under the rubric of behavioral ﬁ­
nance, suggest that price convergence to value is far from instantaneous and possibly involves 
interplay between noise and informed traders. These models are motivated by documented 
anomalous patterns in equity markets and assume some form of psychological bias that aﬀects 
investor behavior. With the beneﬁt of hindsight it seems clear that the technology sector went 
through a bubble-like pattern in the late 1990s and that investor biases (if indeed they exist and 
can be inferred) may have been even more pronounced. Accordingly, our study focuses on the 
medium-term aftermarket in high-tech US IPOs during this period. Using both ordered logit 
regression and split-population hazard modeling approaches, we document momentum and 
reversal patterns that are consistent with the predictions of some behavioral ﬁnance models. 
Our ﬁndings indicate that momentum variables are important while fundamental variables 
have at best weak explanatory power. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of empirical studies relating to IPOs have documented two persistent 
so-called anomalies: the initial underpricing and the long-run underperformance of 
  
IPO ﬁrms. These patterns have been documented in various markets and sample pe­
riods. 1 The theoretical work has mainly attempted to explain the initial underpricing 
phenomenon. 2 Some researchers have argued that the long-run underperformance 
of IPO ﬁrms is not a true anomaly and that the results are sensitive to the way in 
which long-term returns are calculated. 3 Regardless of whether the long-run perfor­
mance of IPO ﬁrms is inferior to or about the same as a control group, there is little 
doubt that the empirical IPO literature suggests signiﬁcant initial price momentum 
and a relatively slow convergence to value. 
As a parallel development, the capital markets literature now embraces a more 
complex view of price discovery. A number of theoretical models, loosely character­
ized under the rubric of behavioral ﬁnance, suggest that price convergence to value is 
far from instantaneous (or even guaranteed) and possibly involves interplay between 
noise and informed traders. 4 Most of these models were developed as theoretical un­
derpinnings to the mounting empirical literature on capital market anomalies that 
challenged one of the bulwarks of modern ﬁnance: the eﬃcient markets hypothesis. 
However, the issue is far from settled and the debate continues. 5 
Many securities markets appear to exhibit short-run momentum and long-run re­
versals. 6 The theories that have emerged to explain this pattern have relied on one or 
more forms of psychological biases that seemingly inﬂuence investor behavior. For 
instance, Daniel et al. (1998), hereafter referred to as DHS, theorize that investor 
overconﬁdence causes overreaction to private signals, undue self-attribution bias 7 
induces the overreaction to continue in the short-run, while the long-run reversal 
is necessarily implied by the initial overreaction. 
In our opinion, the overheated high-tech IPO environment of the late 1990s is an 
ideal testing ground of the DHS and possibly other behavioral theories. The initial 
underpricing of IPOs is likely to be even more pronounced for the high-tech subset 
and an appropriate examination of the aftermarket will uncover momentum and re­
versal patterns if they exist. Focusing on high-tech IPOs rather than including all 
technology companies (or simply looking at a market index) has the advantage of 
a deﬁned starting point for each ﬁrm in the sample. Also, we thought it likely that 
studying the IPO aftermarket has the potential to reveal momentum and/or reversal 
patterns in months rather than years. In other words, our approach may uncover 
patterns implied by behavioral ﬁnance models like DHS in sharp relief and over a 
1 See Loughran et al. (1994) for a survey of the international evidence. Also see Jain and Kini (1994), 
Lee et al. (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
2 See Rock (1986), Welch (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and 
Loughran and Ritter (2002a). 
3 See Brav and Gompers (1997). 
4 See Lee (2001) for a stimulating opinion piece on capital market eﬃciency and Daniel et al. (2001) for 
examples of behavioral ﬁnance models. 
5 See Fama (1998) and Rubinstein (2001) for critiques of the anomalies and behavioral ﬁnance 
literatures. 
6 See Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988) among others. 
7 Investors subject to self-attribution bias interpret validating public signals as conﬁrmation of their 
ability while contrary signals are discounted. 
  
collapsed time period. While the results may not be completely generalizable to a 
wider sample, we think the beneﬁts of our sample choice outweigh the limitations. 
It should be noted that an examination of aftermarket patterns cannot be a di­
rect test of a particular behavioral ﬁnance model. We have chosen to highlight 
DHS because the overconﬁdence and self-attribution biases appear to ring true 
in the context of the previously documented IPO anomalies. Other theories such 
as those proposed by Shiller (1984), Barberis et al. (1998) or Hong and Stein 
(1999) make plausible assumptions about investor behavior and possibly could 
apply just as well. 
Speciﬁcally, we examine the medium-term (6-month) aftermarket in high-tech US 
IPOs launched in the late 1990s. We assume the perspective of an investor who has 
no preferential allotment and has access only to easily available and virtually costless 
information in the public domain. As explained above, the sample is deliberately 
narrowly drawn. Our high-tech IPO ﬁrms fall primarily in the following sectors: 
computer hardware/software, e-commerce, telecommunications and biotechnology. 
Clearly, these sectors are perceived to have huge potential for future growth and 
proﬁtability but individual ﬁrms and their investors face considerable uncertainty 
about the viability of their technology and/or business models. 
We ﬁrst employ an ordered logit regression (OLR) approach, which involves set­
ting up a hierarchy of thresholds of post-IPO market-adjusted returns – this is 
loosely in the spirit of investor determined price targets. We ﬁnd that fundamental 
variables like pre-IPO proﬁtability and age of the company have weak inﬂuence at 
best in explaining post-IPO returns. The aftermarket is driven almost entirely by mo­
mentum variables. We also document post-IPO overreaction and reversal patterns 
consistent with the DHS theory. In order to ensure that the results are robust to 
an alternative estimation procedure, we also implement a split-population hazard 
(SPH) modeling approach. This yields results broadly consistent with those from 
the OLR. In Section 2, we outline the research hypotheses and describe the sample 
and variables used in the study. Section 3 contains a discussion of the OLR method 
and results. The SPH procedure and results are described in Section 4. The ﬁnal sec­
tion contains concluding comments. 
2. Research hypotheses, sample and variable descriptions 
2.1. Research hypotheses 
The essence of the DHS theory in an IPO aftermarket framework is shown in Fig. 
1. Given a favorable private signal, investor overconﬁdence pushes the stock price 
above its rational expected level at time 1. (In the context of our application, this 
would represent Day 1 IPO underpricing.) If public signals are perceived as conﬁrm­
ing the initial private assessment, self-attribution bias drives the price even higher 
and further away from the rational level at time 2 (short-run positive momentum 
in the IPO aftermarket). The arrival of further public information gradually induces 
the price back toward the fundamental level at time 3 and beyond (reversal of the 
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Fig. 1. Hypothesized price patterns with investors exhibiting overconﬁdence and self-attribution biases in 
the IPO aftermarket. Investors receive a private signal at time 0 to the eﬀect that the IPO is underpriced; 
overconﬁdence on their part causes the Day 1 price to overshoot the rational level. Public signals at time 1 
reinforce the private assessment and self-attribution bias causes the price to rise even further at time 2. 
Reversal sets in beyond time 2. This graph is adapted from Fig. 1, p. 1847 of DHS. The discrete time points 
are purely illustrative. For instance, actual time between time 0 and time 1 may be just one day. The dis­
tance between time 1 and time 2 could be several weeks and so on. 
initial positive momentum). This theoretical framework allows us to formulate the 
following research hypotheses: 
H1. If investor biases along the lines suggested by DHS exist in the post-IPO envi­
ronment, we should observe aftermarket patterns that exhibit short-run positive 
momentum and gradual reversal in cumulative market-adjusted returns (CMARs). 
H2. IPO aftermarket patterns will be primarily a function of publicly observable 
momentum variables rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc fundamental variables. 
2.2. Sample description 
In executing the study, we assume the perspective of an investor who has no pref­
erential allotment in the IPO and has access only to freely available information. Our 
self-imposed constraint is that the investor should be able to implement her strategy 
without access to large research departments or subscriptions to expensive data­
bases. Accordingly, our primary sample of high-tech ﬁrms was drawn from ipo.com, 
which lists the universe of US IPOs with dates, oﬀer prices etc. broken down in a 
number of categories. We chose all IPOs from January 1, 1998 through October 
  
30, 1999 in the following sectors: biotechnology, computer hardware, computer soft­
ware, electronics, Internet services, Internet software and telecommunications. This 
resulted in a sample of 301 high-tech IPO ﬁrms. 8 
The Day 1 open price and daily open prices for each ﬁrm in the sample and the 
corresponding NASDAQ index level are downloaded for 125 trading days (�6 
months) beyond the IPO date from yahoo ﬁnance and edreyfus.com. 9 We decided 
on a 6 month aftermarket window for a number of reasons. The study is predicated 
on previous work documenting initial underpricing and long-run underperformance 
(or at least the lack of superior long-run performance) of IPO ﬁrms. The hypothe­
sized price–value divergence of interest relates to the IPO event and future events 
such as seasoned oﬀerings or mergers would confound the ﬁndings – hence the study 
period cannot be too long. On the other hand, the period has to be long enough for 
the anomaly to play out and a meaningful timing strategy implemented from a prac­
titioner viewpoint. Also, the lockup period after which founders can sell their shares 
generally expires after 6 months. This may introduce a source of uncertainty in the 
post 6-month aftermarket that we wanted to avoid. Finally, there was a structural 
market correction in the technology sector in mid 2000. Given that our high-tech 
IPO sample runs through October 1999, we felt it was important to avoid any com­
plicating biases arising from the market correction. All these factors taken together 
convinced us that a 6-month aftermarket window was the appropriate choice. 
2.3. Description of variables 
To study aftermarket patterns, we decided to adopt a framework that involves 
setting up a hierarchy of thresholds of post-IPO market-adjusted returns – loosely 
in the spirit of investor determined price targets. Accordingly, the dependent variable 
is constructed on the basis of an event, which is deﬁned when the CMAR for a ﬁrm 
crosses a given threshold. 
Let Pi1 represent the Day 1 open price of the ith ﬁrm and let Pm1 be the corre­
sponding level of the market (Nasdaq) index. Similarly, Pit and Pmt represent the open 
price at time t of the ith ﬁrm and the market respectively. The CMAR of the ﬁrm at 
time t is calculated as 
Pit=Pi1
CMARit ¼  1: ð1ÞPmt =Pm1
The time in question does not refer to calendar time, but to the time from the IPO 
date. We use 25%, 50%, and 100% as thresholds for the OLR and SPH models. For 
instance, an event occurs when the CMARit exceeds 50%. The following categories 
are useful in explaining the construction of the dependent variable for the OLR and 
SPH models. Each category represents the best possible return in the 6-month period 
8 The original sample was 316; 15 ﬁrms are dropped due to incomplete information on one or more 
explanatory variables. 
9 Price data were cross-checked for validity from alternate sources. 
  
beyond the IPO date. For instance, for Category 4, a return greater than 100% (>1) 
is not possible. 
Categories Description 
Category 1 CMARit is in the 6 0 range 
Category 2 CMARit is in the (0, 0.25] range 
Category 3 CMARit is in the (0.25, 0.50] range 
Category 4 CMARit is in the (0.50, 1] range 
Category 5 CMARit is in the >1 range 
It may appear to the reader that the manner in which we construct our thresholds 
that deﬁne the ordered categories or even the number of categories is somewhat 
ad hoc. This is quite true but far from being a shortcoming, this is actually an advan­
tage in the context of our application. It allows the individual investor to set her own 
bar in terms of CMAR expectation while the model itself is ﬂexible enough to ac­
commodate (within reason) any number of categories. 
The crucial issues that we address in this paper are as follows: What is the prob­
ability that an average ﬁrm's market adjusted returns will cross a given threshold? 
How does this probability change over time in the 6-month IPO aftermarket? (see 
H1 above). Does this probability depend on fundamental or momentum variables? 
(see H2 above). It is worth noting that while we draw upon the DHS framework 
to formulate our research questions, the theory itself seeks to provide a general ex­
planation of market under- and overreactions and does not provide direction on the 
choice of proxy variables for particular applications. Accordingly, potential explan­
atory variables, X , are selected with guidance from the empirical IPO literature and 
researcher intuition. The data sources used are ipo.com, FISonline, Hoovers.com, 
and Carter et al. (1998). The variables and our rationale for their selection are 
described below: 
Variable Expected sign 
Percentage price change: Initial underpricing (or overpricing Negative 
variable) that measures the change from the oﬀer price to 
the open price. If the IPO is severely underpriced, we 
expect aftermarket momentum to be subdued 
Adjusted return in week 1: Momentum (purely technical) Positive 
variable representing the average market-adjusted return 
in the ﬁrst week of trading. It is a proxy for the favorable 
public signal that might induce the DHS self-attribution bias 
Market return in week 1: Momentum (purely technical) Positive 
variable representing the average market return in the 
ﬁrst week of trading. It represents a second-order proxy 
for the self-attribution bias 
  
Variable Expected sign 
Net income/revenue: Net income divided by revenue in the Positive or 
pre-IPO year. A fundamental variable that is a proxy for no eﬀect 
ﬁrm quality 
Underwriter reputation: Lead underwriter's reputation Negative 
based on the Carter–Manaster measure. It has been used in 
previous work to explain underpricing. If accurate pricing 
goes together with underwriter reputation, we expect 
post-IPO biases to be reduced 
Oﬀer size: Oﬀer price multiplied by the number of shares Negative 
sold in the IPO. We use the log value of the oﬀer size. 
The variable is a proxy for size 
Green shoe dummy: Dummy variable for a green shoe No prior 
provision in the IPO contract. This provision gives the 
underwriter the option to purchase additional shares at 
the oﬀer price to cover over allotments. Presence of the 
provision indirectly increases underwriter compensation 
Computer software and hardware dummy: Dummy variable No prior 
takes value 1 if the ﬁrm belongs either to the computer 
hardware or software sectors 
Internet services and software dummy: Dummy variable Positive 
takes value 1 if the ﬁrm belongs either to the Internet 
services or Internet software sectors. A sense that within 
the high-tech sector, the business models of Internet ﬁrms 
(e-commerce or e-commerce enablers) are more uncertain 
Telecommunications dummy: Dummy variable takes No prior 
value 1 if the ﬁrm belongs to the telecommunications sector 
Age before the IPO: Represents the number of years from Positive or 
the date the ﬁrm was incorporated to the IPO date. no eﬀect 
A fundamental variable that is a weak proxy for ﬁrm quality 
Table 1 provides a comparison between the distribution of ﬁrms across the ﬁve 
categories if the investor always cashes out at the point when the threshold is reached 
versus the distribution that results if a simple 6-month 'buy and hold' (BH) strategy 
is adopted. It should be noted that 'selling at the threshold' (ST) is based on perfect 
hindsight and that BH is a na€ıve strategy that involves buying every IPO stock at the 
Day 1 open price and selling it after six months. Nonetheless, the contrast is striking. 
With the ST strategy, 112 ﬁrms (37.2% of the total) end up in category 5 (CMAR 
  
Table 1 
Distribution of IPO ﬁrms across categories based on BH and ST strategies 
Categories Number of ﬁrms 
BH strategy ST strategy 
C1 ( 6 0) 170 48 
C2 (0, 0.25] 21 50 
C3 (0.25, 0.50] 27 37 
C4 (0.50, 1.0] 29 54 
C5 (>1) 54 112 
The BH strategy involves buying at the Day 1 open price and selling exactly six months later.
 
The ST strategy assumes perfect hindsight and requires buying at the Day 1 open price and selling at the
 
point the threshold (not necessarily price peak) is reached.
 
For both BH and ST strategies, observations in a category are based on the best possible returns. For
 
instance, for an observation in C4, greater than 100% (>1) return in the 6-month period beyond the IPO
 
date is not possible.
 
exceeding 100%) whereas only 54 ﬁrms (17.9% of the total) achieve the same 
result under BH. Also, the numbers of ﬁrms ending up in category 1 (negative 
CMAR) are 48 (15.9% of total) for the ST versus 170 (56.5% of total) for the BH 
strategy. 
The advantage of ST over BH is even more compelling when the mean CMARs 
are examined. In Table 2, we present the CMARs associated with holding on to the 
position for 6-months instead of cashing out at the point when the threshold is 
reached. For instance in category C4, the ST strategy would garner mean CMARs 
between 50% and 100% by construction (61.39% to be exact). However, if the long 
position in the 54 ﬁrms that make it to C4 under the ST strategy were maintained for 
6-months, the mean CMAR shrinks to )4.70%. For C3, the swing is from 31.06% to 
)26.17%. 
Table 2 
Mean market-adjusted returns based on ST and after 6-months in the various categories deﬁned by the ST 
strategy 
Categories Number of ﬁrms Mean returns at ST Mean 6-month returns 
(ST strategy) (%) (%) 
C1 ( 6 0) 48 )57.40 )57.40 
C2 (0, 0.25] 50 5.88 )44.79 
C3 (0.25, 0.50] 37 31.06 )26.17 
C4 (0.50, 1.0] 54 61.39 )4.70 
C5 (>1) 112 118.15 133.67 
The mean 6-month returns represent the returns to investors who hold on to the long position for 6­
months instead of ST. 
In category C4, the ST strategy would garner a mean market-adjusted return of between 50 and 100% by 
construction (61.39% to be exact). However, if the long position in the 54 ﬁrms that make it to C4 under 
the ST strategy were maintained for 6-months, the mean market-adjusted return shrinks to )4.70%. 
  
Table 3 
Average factor values across the categories based on the ST strategy 
Variables C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 All 
(60) (0, 0.25] (0.25, 0.50] (0.50, 1.0] (>1) 
Percentage price change 97.91 62.06 51.48 57.81 51.87 61.92 
Adjusted return in week 1 )21.17 )4.08 1.14 4.29 15.51 2.63 
Market return in week 1 )0.47 )0.16 )0.29 0.56 0.51 0.15 
Net income/revenue )1.02 )1.95 )2.17 )1.39 )2.05 )1.77 
Underwriter reputation 0.75 0.64 0.89 0.76 0.88 0.80 
Oﬀer size 17.75 17.94 17.98 18.05 17.96 17.94 
Green shoe dummy 0.44 0.50 0.68 0.65 0.60 0.57 
Computer software and 0.15 0.18 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.17 
hardware dummy 
Internet services and 0.73 0.50 0.43 0.57 0.67 0.60 
software dummy 
Telecommunications 0.10 0.20 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.18 
dummy 
Age before the IPO 4.64 6.07 6.17 5.71 4.82 5.33 
(in years) 
Number of observations 48 50 37 54 112 301 
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics (mean values of explanatory variables) 
across the categories deﬁned by the ST strategy. It is interesting to note that the 
48 ﬁrms that end up in category C1 (strictly negative CMARs beyond the Day 1 
open price) were underpriced by 98% on average compared to 62% for the total 
sample. 10 
Tables 1 and 2 indicate that for all ﬁrms in categories C2 and above (253 ﬁrms 
representing 84% of the sample), the aftermarket CMAR exhibits momentum and 
many of the ﬁrms suﬀer a reversal within a 6-month period. The explanatory vari­
ables deﬁned above may capture aftermarket momentum eﬀects but not reversal – 
a phenomenon that is central to our inquiry. 
Therefore, we construct two additional (artiﬁcial) variables for the OLR model. 
The ﬁrst such variable (time) represents the time in weeks from the IPO date 
to the optimal sell date (deﬁned as the date the threshold is reached, not necessarily 
the peak stock price) and the second variable is simply time squared to capture the 
implicit non-linearity (or reversal). We fully realize that these two variables involve 
ex post look back and cannot be used in a pure predictive model. However, as dis­
cussed in the following OLR results section, we will show that it is possible to sim­
ulate the eﬀect of the time variables to estimate the probabilities of ending up in the 
various categories by evaluating the other non-look back variables. 
10 Loughran and Ritter (2002b, Table 2) report average ﬁrst-day returns to Technology and Internet-
related IPOs of 81.1% in the 1999–2000 period and 22.7% in the 1990–98 period. Our sample underpricing 
average of 61.9% is clearly representative for the 1998–99 period. Also, see Arosio et al. (2000). 
   
3. Ordered logit regression model and results 
3.1. OLR methodology 
We execute an OLR in which the dependent variable is based on the CMARit. 
OLR models are useful when the dependent variable represents an outcome of a de­
cision between a ﬁnite set of alternatives that are naturally ordered (see Greene, 
2000). Examples include opinion surveys (strongly agree, agree, disagree and 
strongly disagree), insurance coverage (full, partial, none), bond ratings, etc. In this 
application, a ﬁrm's aftermarket IPO performance falls into one of the ﬁve ordered 
categories deﬁned above. The OLR model seeks to explain the inﬂuence of variables 
on the probability of the ﬁrm falling into these categories. 
Consider Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5 where Yj, representing category j above, equals 1 if 
CMARit exceeds some threshold value; 0 otherwise. For instance, for Category 5, 
Y5 ¼ 1 if CMARit > 1.0 and Y1 ¼ Y2 ¼ Y3 ¼ Y4 ¼ 0. Similarly Y4 ¼ 1 if CMARit > 0.5, 
but never exceeds 1, and Y1 ¼ Y2 ¼ Y3 ¼ Y5 ¼ 0. The above categories are deﬁned 
when the threshold is ﬁrst reached. At this point, the time variable deﬁned as the 
number of weeks after the IPO date is also recorded. For instance if the ﬁrm's 
CMAR becomes 100% in 20 trading days, Y5 equals 1 and the time variable takes 
on value 4. For the worst category (Y1 ¼ 1) the adjusted return is never positive 
and the time variable is set equal to zero. 
In the estimation process, consider an underlying performance variable (Z) that is 
continuous but only the discrete response is observed. Also, consider the following 
grid that slots ﬁrms in to the various categories: 
Y1 ¼ 1 j Y2 ¼ 1 j Y3 ¼ 1 j Y4 ¼ 1 j Y5 ¼ 1 j 
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 Z 
P ðY1 ¼ 1Þ ¼ P ðZ < c0Þ, P ðY2 ¼ 1Þ ¼ P ðc0 6 Z < c1Þ, etc. For an ordered logit 
model, 
P ðZ < cjÞ ¼  
1 
: ð2Þ 
1 þ expðb0 þ b1X1 þ · · · þ bkXk cjÞ 
The coeﬃcient bj measures the inﬂuence of the explanatory variable Xj on the 
probability of falling into a particular category. The c's are the unknown parameters 
to be estimated along with the b's. These probabilities are used to specify the follow­
ing log-likelihood function that is maximized to obtain the parameter estimates: " # 
N 5 
£ ¼ ðYj ¼ 1Þ ln P ðYj ¼ 1Þ : ð3Þ 
i¼1 j¼1 
X X 
The results of the OLR are reported in Table 4. It should be noted that the inter­
pretation of the coeﬃcients in an OLR is not straightforward. However, in our ap­
plication, a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient implies that the variable positively 
inﬂuences the probability of a good outcome from the investor's point of view, 
  
Table 4 
OLR model estimates 
Parameters Estimates (t-statistics) 
Constant 3.185 
(1.113) 
Time 1.040' 
(11.541) 
Time-squared )0.036' 
()9.853) 
Percentage price change )0.002 
()1.349) 
Market-adjusted return in week 1 0.106' 
(10.785) 
Market return in week 1 0.167' 
(3.060) 
Net income/revenue 0.028 
(0.674) 
Underwriter reputation 0.662'' 
(1.896) 
Oﬀer size )0.200 
()1.200) 
Green shoe dummy 0.551' 
(2.013) 
Computer software and hardware dummy 0.405 
(0.605) 
Internet services and software dummy 1.421' 
(2.140) 
Telecommunications dummy 0.012 
(0.017) 
Age before the IPO (in years) 0.005 
(0.191) 
' and '' denote signiﬁcance at 5% and 10% level respectively. 
The dependent variable is captured in terms of the dummy variables Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5 where Yj ¼ 1 if  
cumulative market adjusted exceeds a given threshold value; 0 otherwise. 
i.e., the probability that the CMAR will end up in category 4 (50–100% range) or 5 
(>100% range) and vice versa. 
3.2. Discussion of OLR results 
The hypothesized momentum and reversal eﬀects are strongly conﬁrmed. Both 
momentum (biased self-attribution) proxy variables: the IPO ﬁrm's average mar­
ket-adjusted return and the average market (Nasdaq) return in the ﬁrst week following 
the IPO have positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. Further, the time and time-
squared variables are also strongly signiﬁcant with positive and negative coeﬃcients 
respectively. In the context of the DHS price formation theory, overconﬁdent inves­
tors cause stock prices to overreact initially (the jump from oﬀer to market open 
price), biased self-attribution potentially induced by upward movement in the IPO 
ﬁrm's stock price and the market generally in the week following the IPO causes a 
  
further overreaction (the continuation of positive returns implied by our momentum 
variables) and the eventual reversal sets in as price–value convergence is induced 
with the continual arrival of public information (inferred from our time-squared 
variable and the patterns documented in Tables 1 and 2). From the speculative in­
vestor's point of view, it pays to hold the stock for a while in the initial period after 
the IPO because the probability of landing in the higher categories is improving but 
as more time passes, this probability wanes. 
Also, as hypothesized, fundamental variables do not appear to inﬂuence the IPO 
aftermarket. For instance, the proﬁtability (or lack thereof) of the ﬁrm measured as 
net income/revenue in the pre-IPO year has no eﬀect. Similarly, the number of years 
that the ﬁrm has been in business prior to the IPO (age before the IPO) does not seem 
to matter. These are classic 'old-economy' variables that supposedly enable forma­
tion of expectations about future cash ﬂows and/or risk. Also, the extent of initial 
underpricing (measured as the percentage price change from the IPO oﬀer price to 
the Day 1 open market price) does not play a role in the aftermarket. Perhaps the 
IPO oﬀer price in conjunction with the ﬁrst available market price (Day 1 open) sub­
sumes other fundamental information (such as proﬁtability and ﬁrm age) contained 
in the prospectus and therefore these variables ought not to aﬀect aftermarket prices 
in an eﬃcient markets framework. However, a less benign explanation is that mo­
mentum investors, for whom fundamental variables do not matter, dominate the im­
mediate aftermarket. 
Some variables related to the IPO contract do seem to matter. Underwriter repu­
tation 11 (contrary to our prior) and the presence of a green shoe provision are asso­
ciated with positive aftermarket returns while the oﬀer size appears to have no eﬀect. 
Within the high-tech umbrella, designation as an Internet ﬁrm is associated with pos­
itive aftermarket returns; other industry dummy variables are insigniﬁcant. 
It is worth exploring the underwriter reputation variable a little further. We had 
expected that it would be negatively related to aftermarket returns – the logic being 
that highly ranked underwriters would set a more accurate oﬀer price and a percep­
tion of fairer pricing would dampen aftermarket biases. In fact earlier studies do sug­
gest that initial underpricing (or the amount of money left on the table by the IPO 
ﬁrm) is inversely related to underwriter reputation (see Carter et al., 1998). But this 
relationship seems to have ﬂipped (turned positive) in the 1990s and especially in the 
1999–2000 period (see Loughran and Ritter, 2002b, Table 7). Why should this be the 
case? Loughran and Ritter (2002b) propose two hypotheses: (a) ‘‘the analyst cover­
age hypothesis’’ – the idea here is that the issuing ﬁrm places more importance on 
snagging a lead underwriter with a highly ranked analyst to cover the ﬁrm and down-
plays underpricing; and (b) ‘‘the corruption hypothesis’’ – this refers to side pay­
ments made by the underwriter to founders and senior executives of the issuing 
ﬁrm usually in the form of allocation of shares in other hot IPOs. 
11 The original analysis was done using the Carter–Manaster reputation rankings. We found that 
almost all the lead underwriters in our sample were at the high end (>7). We ultimately substituted the 
Carter–Manaster number with a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the underwriter ranking was 
greater than 7; 0 otherwise. 
  
We think that these hypotheses are compatible with the DHS theory and our own 
ﬁndings. The source of investor overconﬁdence and self-attribution biases particu­
larly in technology stocks could well have been less-than-objective sell-side analyst 
recommendations serving as public signals. Numerous recent stories in the business 
press have reported on the conﬂicts of interests and the breaching of Chinese walls 
between the brokerage-advice and investment banking divisions at major Wall Street 
ﬁrms. 12 If anything, underwriter incentives are served ﬁrstly through underpricing 
but also by propping up the price in the aftermarket so that their preferred clients 
can bail out in an orderly manner. 
We do not wish to convey the impression that the DHS theory is the only expla­
nation for the momentum/reversal patterns that we document in the high-tech IPO 
aftermarket. It is however a reasonably convincing theoretical framework within 
which it is possible to formulate and empirically test hypotheses, as we have at­
tempted to do in this study. There are a number of other theories that also attempt 
to explain generally the less-than-eﬃcient market reaction to various types of events. 
For instance Hong and Stein (1999) postulate two classes of investors: momentum 
investors who chase price trends and ignore fundamental information causing price 
overreactions in the process; and news watchers who use fundamental information 
but ignore prices and are thereby the source for underreactions. It is possible that 
the IPO aftermarket patterns that we detect could be explained in such a frame­
work. 13 The DHS theory does have the advantage of being grounded in psycholog­
ical biases that have been veriﬁed in experimental settings. In our opinion, it would 
be diﬃcult if not impossible to design an empirical study using capital market data to 
directly test any of the behavioral ﬁnance theories. 
Our OLR model cannot be used in a traditional predictive sense because the time 
variable is constructed using ex post look back. However, it is possible to simulate 
the probabilities of various outcomes for diﬀerent values of the time variable. In 
Fig. 2, we report the results of the simulation analysis that generates predicted pro­
portions for categories 4 and 5 combined (market-adjusted returns in excess of 50%) 
with respect to time expressed in number of weeks, and the other explanatory vari­
ables at their actual ex ante values for each ﬁrm. The simulated proportions (or 
probabilities) are averaged across our sample of 301 high-tech IPO ﬁrms. 
The probability of earning market-adjusted returns of at least 50% increases over 
time, peaks at around 14 weeks from the IPO date and wanes thereafter. It is impor­
tant to note that the probabilities reported in Fig. 2 are conditional on the time vari­
able taking on a positive value. As indicated earlier, the value of the time variable is 
determined when the ordered threshold is crossed but takes on a value of zero if the 
ﬁrm never does cross any positive market-adjusted return threshold, i.e., ends up 
being a category 1 ﬁrm. Therefore, in determining the cash-out point with ex-ante 
simulation, the probability estimates that the model generates are overstated. The 
12 See for instance Morgenson (2002).
 
13 Or indeed in other settings as in Shiller (1984), Barberis et al. (1998) or Delong et al. (1990).
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Fig. 2. Predicted probability of 50% or higher returns from an ordered logit model. Results of a simula­
tion exercise with respect to the time variable where all other variables are evaluated based on their ex-ante 
actual values. Proportions for Categories 4 and 5 simulated for each ﬁrm and then averaged across the 
sample. The above simulated results are conditional on positive adjusted returns since we have set time ¼ 0 
for negative returns. These results are broadly comparable with raw data. The raw mean of the time vari­
able corresponding to each category is given by 0 weeks for C1, 3.8 weeks for C2, 8.1 weeks for C3, 12.7 
weeks for C4, and 9.6 weeks for C5. 
pattern of the probability numbers (but not the numbers themselves) is the salient 
information to be drawn from Fig. 2. 
4. Split-population hazard model and results 
4.1. SPH methodology 
As mentioned earlier, the time variable in our OLR model is constructed artiﬁ­
cially with the beneﬁt of ex post look back. We use an alternative statistical tech­
nique to endogenize the inﬂuence of 'time' and also to check how well the 
aftermarket patterns hold up. Hazard rate models are often employed to explain 
the duration of an event of interest (see Greene, 2000). In this paper, we deﬁne an 
event when the CMAR crosses a certain threshold. A hazard rate model is used to 
capture the eﬀect of various factors on the instantaneous probability that a given 
threshold is crossed. Further, it also enables us to capture the timing issue by ana­
lyzing how this probability changes over time. 
Standard hazard rate models are implicitly based on the assumption of certain 
exit implying that the event will eventually be deﬁned. However, since an IPO invest­
   
    
  
ment may not always lead to the market-adjusted threshold returns of 25%, 50%, or 
100%, we use a SPH model (see Bandopadhyaya and Jaggia (2001) for details) that 
takes into account the possibility that for some ﬁrms the exit may never occur. We 
run three separate SPH models (for thresholds of 25%, 50%, and 100%) where the 
hazard parameters are estimated along with a split parameter that represents the 
probability of eventual success. 
We observe two kinds of ﬁrms: (a) ﬁrms that reach the threshold (complete obser­
vations) and (b) ﬁrms that do not reach the threshold (censored observations). Let a 
censoring variable C equal 1 for complete and 0 for censored observations. In stan­
dard hazard rate models the contribution of complete and censored observations, 
conditional on the X 's, at time t are P ðT ¼ tÞ and P ðT > ti) respectively. In an 
SPH model, the contributions are dP ðT ¼ ti) and 1 d þ dP ðT > tiÞ respectively 
where d represents the probability of eventual success. We use a log-logistic hazard 
function given by 
hðt; X Þ ¼  expðX bÞata 1ð1 þ expðb0X ÞtaÞ 1 ; ð4Þ 
where b0X ¼ b0 þ b1X1 þ b2X2 þ · · · þ  bkXk , and a is the shape parameter of the 
hazard that determines the point after which the hazard declines. It is useful to note 
that if a variable has a positive impact on the hazard, then it has a negative impact 
on the time it takes to reach a threshold. The log-likelihood function for an SPH is 
N 
£ ¼ C½ln d þ ln a þ w 2 lnð1 þ e wÞ] þ ð1 CÞ½lnð1 d þ dð1 þ e wÞÞ 1]; 
i¼1 
X 
ð5Þ 
where w ¼ b0X þ a ln t and C is a censoring variable. The split parameter d allows the 
probability of eventual success to be diﬀerent from one and if the estimated d is not 
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1, the split model converges to a standard hazard model. 
4.2. SPH model results and discussion 
The results from the SPH regressions for market-adjusted return thresholds of 
25%, 50%, and 100% respectively are presented in Table 5. We observe that they 
are generally consistent with those obtained from the OLR procedure. The momen­
tum variables – the ﬁrm's average market-adjusted return and the average market 
(Nasdaq) return in the ﬁrst week following the IPO – are signiﬁcant and positively 
inﬂuence the hazard (instantaneous probability of reaching the speciﬁed threshold 
given that it has not been achieved up to the previous instant) for all three thresh­
olds. Also, the shape parameter a is strongly signiﬁcant and greater than one for 
all thresholds. Recall that this parameter in the hazard-modeling context indicates 
how 'elapsed time' plays a role in explaining the hazard over time. In our application, 
given the log-logistic speciﬁcation, the a estimate indicates that the hazard increases 
initially, reaches a peak and then begins to wane. The hypothesized momentum-
reversal aftermarket patterns are unequivocally conﬁrmed by the SPH modeling 
approach. 
  
Table 5 
Estimates of the split-population log-logistic hazard models for the 25%, 50%, and 100% thresholds 
Parameters Estimates (t-value) 
25% 50% 100% 
Constant )4.198 )1.321 )1.220 
()1.312) ()0.398) ()0.311) 
Percentage price change )0.004 ' )0.002 )0.004 '' 
()2.146) ()1.114) ()1.799) 
Adjusted return in week 1 0.072 ' 0.070 ' 0.071 ' 
(10.241) (10.020) (8.934) 
Market return in week 1 0.103 ' 0.165 ' 0.130 ' 
(1.991) (3.144) (2.041) 
Net income/revenue )0.027 0.079 '' )0.039 
()0.665) (1.880) ()0.790) 
Underwriter reputation 0.976 ' 0.527 1.531 ' 
(2.493) (1.477) (3.290) 
Oﬀer size )0.001 )0.235 )0.436 '' 
()0.005) ()1.212) ()1.906) 
Green shoe dummy 1.247 ' 0.604 ' 0.412 
(4.475) (2.152) (1.255) 
Computer software and 0.853 0.878 1.530 '' 
hardware dummy (1.211) (1.260) (1.729) 
Internet services and soft­ 1.128 1.909 ' 2.650 ' 
ware dummy (1.632) (2.867) (2.993) 
Telecommunications dummy 0.367 0.845 1.007 
(0.513) (1.217) (1.105) 
Age before the IPO (in years) )0.017 0.001 0.015 
()0.587) (0.058) (0.398) 
a (shape parameter) 1.453 ' 1.382 ' 1.822 ' 
(3.721) (2.701) (4.431) 
d (split parameter) 0.826 ' 0.881 0.708 ' 
()4.004) ()1.483) ()4.288) 
' and '' denote signiﬁcance at 5% and 10% level respectively.
 
For a and d, the t-statistic is evaluated at 1.
 
The regression coeﬃcients capture the inﬂuence of the factors on the hazard. The shape parameter a
 
determines the point after which the hazard declines. The split parameter d represents the probability of
 
eventual success.
 
The fundamental variables, net income/revenue and age before the IPO, are gener­
ally insigniﬁcant as we found under OLR; the one exception is that net income/rev­
enue is weakly signiﬁcant for the 50% threshold. The inﬂuence of the other 
explanatory variables is broadly in line with the OLR ﬁndings. The underwriter rep­
utation variable is positively associated with the hazard in all cases and highly signif­
icant for the 25% and 100% thresholds. Similarly, the green shoe and the Internet 
industry dummy variable coeﬃcients are positive as before but signiﬁcant only in 
two out of three cases. One diﬀerence in the SPH ﬁndings is that the underpricing 
variable (percentage price change) has the hypothesized negative sign and is signiﬁ­
cant in two out three cases. This indicates that the higher the extent of initial under­
pricing the lower the probability of crossing the aftermarket threshold. In the OLR 
estimation, this coeﬃcient was negative although insigniﬁcant. 
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Fig. 3. Aggregate hazard of the split-population log-logistic models for the 25%, 50%, and 100% thresh­
olds. The aggregate hazard is calculated for the estimated SPH models with the factors evaluated at their 
mean value. 
The lack of complete concordance between OLR and SPH is not really surprising 
given that they are non-nested statistical procedures involving maximum likelihood 
estimation. We are pleased to note that regardless of the procedure, our hypotheses 
regarding aftermarket patterns and the dominance of momentum over fundamental 
variables hold up very well. 
SPH yields an additional insight, i.e., the probability that the threshold will be 
reached eventually though not necessarily within 6 months. This point estimate is 
captured by the split parameter d, which is strongly signiﬁcant for the 25 
(d ¼ 0:826) and 100 (d ¼ 0:708)% thresholds. 14 
In Fig. 3, we plot the aggregate hazard against duration in weeks from the IPO 
date. We observe that the hazard ramps up in the initial weeks, reaches a peak 
and then declines. For the 50% (100%) threshold, the peak is reached at around 5 
(13) weeks, which also represents the optimal cash-out points averaged across our 
sample. Recall from Fig. 2 that the OLR procedure indicated that the simulated 
probability of reaching a threshold of 50% or better (combined probabilities for 
the C4 and C5 categories) reached a maximum at 14 weeks. The broad aftermarket 
patterns of momentum and reversal are revealed under both modeling approaches. 
14 Our model displays a slight inconsistency with regard to the split parameter d. Ideally, we would like 
to see a declining estimate as the threshold increases. But the insigniﬁcant d coeﬃcient (0.881) for the 50% 
threshold lies above that for the 25% threshold. We reran the model for a 75% threshold and reassuringly 
obtained an estimate of 0.72, which is below the 0.826 probability for the 25% threshold and above the 
0.708 probability for the 100% threshold. 
Note that the aggregate hazard function for the 25% threshold has a more pro­
nounced inverted U shape with the peak reached just 2 weeks after the IPO date 
and a fairly rapid fall-of thereafter. By contrast, the hazard functions for the 50% 
and 100% thresholds rise and fall more gently with the peaks reached at a lower 
point than the 25% threshold. This ﬁts with the intuitive expectation that a lower 
threshold strategy can be executed relatively quickly with a higher probability of suc­
cess. The required holding period increases with the threshold while the probability 
of actually reaching the threshold declines, as would be the case with any speculative 
investment strategy. 
A recent paper by Aggarwal et al. (2002) presents an interesting model where 
managers strategically underprice IPOs to maximize wealth by selling shares at lock­
up expiration. In their model, initial underpricing generates momentum, which pre­
sumably lasts through the lockup expiration date. While our study does not explicitly 
control for the lockup expiration, we limit our aftermarket analysis to six months 
beyond the IPO date. And as discussed above, the momentum lasts for only a few 
weeks before the reversal sets in. Unless the lockup expiration is well below six 
months (which seems unlikely) for the ﬁrms in our sample, our results would appear 
to contradict the prediction of their model. On the other hand, managers would not 
care about market-adjusted returns but simply raw returns and we have not consid­
ered unconditional momentum-reversal patterns based on unadjusted aftermarket 
prices. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the 6-month aftermarket in high-tech US IPOs launched in 
the late 1990s. We draw on the DHS theoretical framework of investor overconﬁ­
dence and biased self-attribution to hypothesize short-run positive momentum and 
gradual reversal in post IPO returns. Both our methodological approaches (OLR 
and SPH) conﬁrm these patterns. We also ﬁnd that momentum variables explain 
most of the aftermarket price behavior while fundamental indicators have weak 
inﬂuence at best. 
At this stage, we are unsure if our results can be replicated with a broader sam­
ple and in a more benign investment climate than the late 1990s. Our sense is that 
while our narrowly drawn sample may exhibit somewhat more extreme character­
istics, the long-standing IPO underpricing anomaly is likely to portend similar if 
more muted IPO aftermarket patterns. A number of regulatory changes have oc­
curred in recent years. The eﬀective repeal of Glass–Steagall has resulted in signif­
icant consolidation in Wall Street ﬁrms – the merger of Citicorp with Salomon 
Smith Barney (via the Travelers Group) being a case in point. Market observers 
have noted that this development may have exacerbated the potential for conﬂicts 
of interest. Also, stock exchanges in the US (and in many other countries) relaxed 
listing requirements enabling ﬁrms with limited track records to launch IPOs. So it 
is entirely possible that empirical results obtained with data from the 1990s (and 
particularly the late 1990s) may not carry over to earlier periods – the Loughran 
and Ritter (2002b) paper clearly suggests this in the context of IPO underpricing 
and the underlying factors. 15 
We believe that the IPO aftermarket is a fertile area for empirical analysis. As the 
ﬁnance literature embraces a more nuanced view of market eﬃciency, there may be 
unique opportunities to test the predictions of various theories that admit psycholog­
ical biases in investor behavior. The late 1990s will also aﬀord researchers the ability 
to gain insights into how investor biases can be exploited by opportunistic agents (be 
they ﬁnancial intermediaries or insider-managers) in a bubble-like environment. Ap­
propriately designed studies will not only deepen our understanding of market be­
havior but also inform the public policy debate in the areas of corporate 
governance, investor protection and securities law reform. 
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